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Gender Discrimination in Online Markets
Christopher A. Cotropia, Jonathan S. Masur, and David L. Schwartz†
Abstract
We study whether a seller’s gender impacts the bargained-for price in a product market,
specifically baseball cards, as well whether any discrimination that might be present is tastebased or statistically-based. We accomplish this by isolating the seller’s gender using an online
transaction on eBay where the buyer is exposed to the seller’s gender by only the seller’s hand
and name. We test for differential treatment in two environments: a field experiment, in which
we actually sell cards on eBay, and a laboratory experiment, in which we conduct surveys via
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We find that there is consistent differential treatment of
female sellers across both environments. However, this treatment runs in the opposite direction
of the discrimination found in most studies of gender. We find that women sell baseball cards for
a higher price and greater profit on eBay compared to men. This finding was replicated in the
MTurk study. The MTurk study suggested that the reason for a higher price appears to be at least
partially based on statistical discrimination, with respondents believing that female sellers were
more likely to handle the card carefully and promptly mail it after purchase and less likely to
present problems in completing the transaction. Part of the discrimination may also be taste–
based. In the eBay experiment, women obtained higher prices and profits even for cards that had
been professionally graded, where the quality of the card should not have been in doubt. And
MTurk respondents were also more likely to want to meet the female sellers in person and
believed they were attractive.
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participants at a Richmond Law School faculty workshop and the 2018 Empirical Legal Studies Annual Conference at
the University of Michigan for helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts, Isaac Ashworth and Isabella
0ascimento for excellent research assistance, and Eleanor Wilking for tremendous assistance with the empirical
analysis.
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Gender Discrimination in Online Markets
Christopher Cotropia, Jonathan Masur, and David Schwartz
Introduction
Much of the literature on gender discrimination in the marketplace has focused on the
market for labor. 1 Numerous studies have documented that women are paid less than men for
comparable work;2 that they have greater difficulty finding employment than men;3 and that
often receive worse performance reviews than similarly situated men and are more likely to be
fired from their jobs.4 A smaller literature has examined discrimination against women in pricesetting situations, typically as purchasers of goods or services.5 For example, one study examined
gender differences in bargaining outcomes in the taxi market and found discrimination against
women in the form of higher fares.6 A series of studies found that automobile dealerships quoted
women higher prices than men.7
The relatively small literature on women as sellers in the market, as opposed to purchasers
or labor force participants, has come to much the same conclusion.8 In an early seminal paper,
John List studied both seller and purchaser discrimination due to race and gender in the baseball
1

Darity, W. Jnr. and Mason, P. (1998). ‘Evidence on discrimination in employment: codes of color, codes
of gender’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, pp. 63–90; Riach, P.A. and Rich, J., 2002. Field experiments of
discrimination in the market place. The economic journal, 112(483).
2
Blau, F.D. and Kahn, L.M., 2000. Gender differences in pay. Journal of Economic perspectives, 14(4), pp.75-99; Clara
Kulich, Grzegorz Trojanowski, Michelle K. Ryan, S. Alexander Haslam & Luc D. R. Renneboog, Who Gets the Carrot
and Who Gets the Stick? Evidence of Gender Disparities in Executive Remuneration, 32 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 301, 308.
311 (2011); Youngjoo Cha & Kim A. Weeden, Overwork and the Slow Convergence in the Gender Gap in Wages, 79
AM. SOC. REV. 457, 469-71 (2014).
3
Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 738 (2000); David Neumark, Roy J. Bank & Kyle D. Van Nort, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant
Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q. J. ECON. 915, 936 (1996); Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in Top
Corporate Jobs, 55 ILR REV. 3, 17 (2001).
4
Hannák, A., Wagner, C., Garcia, D., Mislove, A., Strohmaier, M. and Wilson, C., 2017, February. Bias in Online
Freelance Marketplaces: Evidence from TaskRabbit and Fiverr. In CSCW (pp. 1914-1933); Francine D. Blau & Jed
DeVaro, New Evidence on Gender Differences in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 46 INDUS. REL. 511, 530-31
(2007).
5
David W. Harless & George E. Hoffer, Do Women Pay More for New Vehicles? Evidence from Transaction Price Data,
92 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 278 (2002).
6
Castillo, M., Petrie, R., Torero, M. and Vesterlund, L., 2013. Gender differences in bargaining outcomes: A field
experiment on discrimination. Journal of Public Economics, 99, pp.35-48.
7
Ayres, I. and Siegelman, P., 1995. Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. The American
Economic Review, pp.304-321; Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates
of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 116 (1995); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARVARD L. REV. 817, 819 (1991); Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Risso,
Consumer Information and Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and
Minorities? 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING ECON. 65, 81, 91 (2003). But see Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Dealer Price
Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622, 635.
(1996).
8
Notably, women hold 48% of retail sales jobs in the United States. https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm.
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card market.9 Specifically, List observed that female sellers received lower initial and final offers
when selling a high-value baseball card to dealers at a card convention.10 Similarly, a recent study
by Tamar Kricheli-Katz and Tali Regev found that female sellers on eBay received fewer bids and
lower final prices compared to equally qualified male sellers of the exact same product.11 Female
sellers, on average, received about 80 cents for every dollar a male seller received when selling
the identical new product and 97 cents for every dollar a male seller received when selling the
same used product.12 We know of only one study in which female sellers have done better than
male sellers. Using proprietary transaction level data, Amandine Ody-Brasier and Isabel
Fernandez-Mateo found that female champagne grape growers are able to charge systematically
higher prices than male grape growers.13 The study concluded that the underlying mechanism
for this unexpected pattern of results involves the relationships developed and maintained by
female members.14
The existing literature thus leaves open several important questions. First, are women subject
to discrimination when acting as sellers in the marketplace, particularly an online marketplace,
and what is the direction of that discrimination? Second, if discrimination exists, what is the
mechanism that underlies that discrimination? Economists and legal scholars typically
differentiate between taste-based (or “animus-based”) discrimination and statistical
discrimination. In this context, taste-based discrimination is generated by simple preferences for
or against individuals on the basis of some characteristic (such as gender). For instance, a putative
purchaser might hold a preference for dealing with a male (or female) seller, simply because of
that seller’s gender. Under a standard model of discrimination, the purchaser would be willing to
pay a higher price or suffer an inferior purchasing experience in order to transact with a male (or
female) seller.15 Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, is generated by stereotyped beliefs
9

List, J.A., 2004. The nature and extent of discrimination in the marketplace: Evidence from the field. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 119(1), pp.49-89.
10
Id. In another important study, Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya tested whether consumers discriminate against sellers
on the basis of the race, rather than gender. Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, & Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005).
11
Kricheli-Katz, T. and Regev, T., 2016. How many cents on the dollar? Women and men in product markets. Science
advances, 2(2), p.e1500599. In a follow-on study, Kricheli-Katz and Regev found that female sellers of an Amazon
gift card were offered less than male sellers of the same gift card, despite the fact that the products were identical.
Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Tali Regev, Competence, Desert, and Trust – Why Are Women Penalized in Online Product
Market Interactions?, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83, 93 (2017). We unsuccessfully attempted to replicate the followon study. Our replication study used 240 subjects on MTurk. We found no statistically significant differences on the
value of an Amazon gift card based upon the gender of the seller. The best estimate of the effect, including
demographic control variables and significant at the 90% confidence level, was that female sellers were offered more
than male sellers.
12
Id. In detailed regression tables in an online appendix, Kricheli-Katz & Regev report that the gender of the seller
isn’t statistically significantly related to sales price in the sports memorabilia category except for “new” items sold
by
women.
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/suppl/2016/02/16/2.2.e1500599.DC1/1500599_SM.pdf. Thus,
our results find significance where Kricheli-Katz and Regev do not, but our results do not find an opposite effect.
13
Ody-Brasier, A. and Fernandez-Mateo, I., 2017. When Being in the Minority Pays Off: Relationships among Sellers
and Price Setting in the Champagne Industry. American Sociological Review, 82(1), pp.147-178.
14
Id.
15
Gary S. Becker, The Economics Of Discrimination 15 (2d ed. 1971).
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about what an individual characteristic (such as gender) reveals about the quality of the
individual or the good the individual is providing.16 Here, statistical discrimination could occur if
buyers operate under the stereotyped belief that female sellers will provide worse (or better)
purchasing experiences or lower- (or higher-) quality goods. Understanding the type of
discrimination at work has important ramifications both for understanding human behavior and
for evaluating potential policy responses to the discrimination. There is a robust economics
literature attempting to disentangle taste-based and statistically-based discrimination in various
contexts.17
Our study sets out to both test whether a seller’s gender impacts the bargained-for price in a
product market as well whether any discrimination that might be present is taste-based or
statistically-based. We accomplish this by isolating gender using an online transaction on eBay
where the buyer is exposed to the seller’s gender only through the seller’s hand (a literal framing
effect) and name.18 This method of isolating the trait being tested for prompting discrimination
is based in part on an earlier study focused on race and price bargaining by Ayers et. al.19 Such
isolation ensures that the behavior or demeanor of the seller cannot influence any observed
differential treatment of sellers of different genders. The perceived gender of the seller, the trait
tested as the basis for discrimination, is the only factor that varies.20 We also hold the initial
offering price the same for all sellers, with all bidding done by the buyers. This removes potential
gender effects on initial offers or negotiating style or strategy. It allows us to isolate the effect of
the seller’s gender on buyer behavior.
We test for differential treatment in two environments: a field experiment, in which we
actually sell products on eBay, and a laboratory experiment, in which we conduct surveys via
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Following List and Ayres et al., we use baseball cards, many of
which are professionally graded as to condition, and all of which are contained in clear plastic
sleeves to protect their condition.
We chose baseball cards for many of the same reasons as List and Ayres et al. There is a
relatively robust market for baseball cards on eBay with hundreds of thousands of cards on
auction at any time, as well as an extensive literature studying the baseball card auction
16

Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 659 (1972); Richard A. Epstein,
Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (1992).
17
Guryan, J. and Charles, K.K., 2013. Taste-based or Statistical Discrimination: The Economics of Discrimination
Returns to its Roots. The Economic Journal, 123(572). Guryan and Charles note that many studies fail to distinguish
between these two potential types of discrimination: “traditional regression-based approaches” fail to “disentangle
the relative importance of animus versus statistical discrimination in explaining such discrimination.”
18
There is a substantial body of literature that uses eBay as an experimental venue. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato,
Price, Quality, and Reputation: Evidence from an Online Field Experiment, 37 RAND J. ECON. 983, 995-96 (2006);
Jennifer Brown, Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from
the Field, 125 Q. J. ECON. 859, 870 (2010); Joseph Engelberg & Jared Williams, eBay’s Proxy Bidding: A License to Shill,
72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 509, 521 (2009); Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson & Kate Lockwood, The
Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 79, 96 (2006).
19
Ayres, I., Banaji, M. and Jolls, C., 2015. Race effects on eBay. The RAND Journal of Economics, 46(4), pp.891-917.
20
Id.
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markets.21 The nature of baseball cards also allows us to control for the quality of the product,
through information that can be verified by the purchaser, in a manner that is impossible in many
other markets. One feature of this market, which is of particular importance to our study of
gender discrimination, is that the vast majority of purchasers and sellers of baseball cards are
men. 22 We discuss this fact and its ramifications for our study in the sections that follow. We
also use the baseball card collecting experience, or lack thereof, and gender of the buyer in our
statistical analysis in an attempt to take the gendered nature of this market into account.
In our sales, we vary only two things: the name of the seller, which in some cases is
stereotypically female and in other cases stereotypically male, and the hand of the individual
holding the card, which is visible on the eBay or MTurk page. We selected hands that are
stereotypically female and male to match the names: the fingernails of the female hands are
painted light pink, while the male hands have quite a bit of visible arm hair. The eBay field
experiment allows us to assess the presence of discrimination in a market in which real money is
being exchanged for real baseball cards. The MTurk experiment allows us to pose questions to
hypothetical purchasers that shed light on whether any observed discrimination is due to tastebased or statistical discrimination. For instance, we can attempt to determine whether the
purchaser has an affinity for the seller (indicating taste-based discrimination), or whether the
purchaser believes that the seller will handle the product better (or worse) or deliver a higher (or
lower) quality product, which would serve as indications of statistical discrimination.
We find that there is consistent differential treatment of female sellers across both
environments. However, this treatment runs in the opposite direction of the discrimination found
in most studies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, female sellers sold cards for a higher price and
greater profit on eBay compared to the male sellers, albeit with weak statistical significance. This
finding was replicated in the MTurk study. The MTurk study suggested that the reason for a
higher price appears to be at least partially based on statistical discrimination, with respondents
believing that female sellers were more likely to handle the card carefully and promptly mail it
after purchase, and less likely to present problems in completing the transaction. Part of the
discrimination may also be taste-based. In the eBay environment, female sellers obtained higher
prices and profits even for cards that had been professionally graded, where the quality of the
card should not have been in doubt. This raises the implication that eBay purchasers simply had
a taste for purchasing from women. Respondents were also more likely to want to meet the
female sellers in person and believed they were attractive.

21

Id.; List (2004); Clark Nardinelli & Curtis Simon, Customer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Memorabilia: The
Case of Baseball, 105 Q. J. ECON. 575, 594 (1990); Eric Primm, Nicole Leeper Piquero, Alex R. Piquero & Robert M.
Regoli, Investigating Customer Racial Discrimination in the Secondary Baseball Card Market, 81 SOC. INQUIRY 110, 122
(2011); John D. Hewitt, Robert Muñoz, Jr., William L. Oliver & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Performance, and Baseball
Card Values, 29 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 411, 419 (2005); Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, Price, Quality, and Reputation:
Evidence from an Online Field Experiment, 37 RAND J. ECON. 983, 995-96 (2006); Paul E. Gabriel, Curtis Johnson &
Timothy J. Stanton, An Examination of Customer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Baseball Memorabilia, 68 J.
BUS. 215, 228 (1995).
22
https://www.sportscardforum.com/articles/2011/06/wow-you-collect-sports-cards-and-youre-female/.
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The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we detail the methodologies we employed in the
eBay field experiment and MTurk laboratory experiment. In Part II, we report the results of both
studies. Finally, in Part III we discuss the implications of our results regarding the existence and
direction of discrimination in online auctions, as well as the likely causes of that discrimination.
I.

Methodology

We performed two related yet distinct experiments to test the effect of the seller’s gender23
on market price. The first is a field experiment on eBay, auctioning baseball cards randomly
assigned to male and female sellers. Users of eBay were unaware of the experiment and the
winning bidder was provided with the card. The second is a “laboratory” experiment on Amazon
mechanical turkers (“MTurkers”), randomly providing subjects with an image of a baseball card
sold by either a man or a woman. The MTurker subjects answered a series of questions about
the card and the seller, permitting us to learn more about potential mechanisms for price setting
and purchase decisions.
Before providing a more detailed description of the methodology of both experiments to test
the impact of a seller’s gender, a quick note on the reason we chose baseball cards as the product
being sold. First, just as Ayres et al. recognized, there is a large and active market for baseball
cards on eBay, maximizing the likely competition and bidding for the product being sold and thus
the robustness of our results.24 And there is an extensive literature studying the baseball card
auction markets, including selling cards on eBay, allowing us to leverage the findings and lessons
of this literature to properly construct our experiment.25
Furthermore, a single picture of a baseball card, which is the main manipulation in our study,
readily displays many, if not all, of the value-characteristics of the product. This means no further
interaction or inspection of the subject product is needed to determine value, making baseball
cards uniquely suited for online auctions, particularly when professional graded cards being sold.
We are thus able to better isolate the effects of gender.

23

The term “gender” is used throughout this paper, and in the experiments, to mean the perceived gender of an
individual based on their outward appearance and name. That is, whether the individual “looks” male or female or
is considered, based on relevant social and cultural understanding, to have a male or female “sounding” name.
This is the same use of the term “gender” throughout the literature this paper and contained studies are
engaging—whether a buyer’s perception of the seller externally appearing male or female influences the price that
buyer is willing to pay for the sold item.
24
Ayres, I., Banaji, M. and Jolls, C., 2015. Race effects on eBay. The RAND Journal of Economics, 46(4), pp.891-917.
There are frequently over a quarter million baseball cards for auction at any given time.
25
See, e.g., Highfill, J. and O'Brien, K., 2009. The determinants of sales on eBay: The case of baseball cards. Applied
Economics Letters, 16(14), pp.1421-1424; Highfill, J. and O'Brien, K., 2008. Do price guides guide eBay prices: The
market for individual baseball cards. The American Economist, 52(1), pp.58-65; Haley, M.R. and Van Scyoc, L., 2010.
Adverse selection, seller reputation and buyer insurance in online auctions for 1960s-era collectible baseball cards.
Applied Economics Letters, 17(14), pp.1341-1345; Jin, G.Z. and Kato, A., 2006. Price, quality, and reputation:
Evidence from an online field experiment. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), pp.983-1005.
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Of course, baseball cards are typically seen as a “male” product in that men are typically those
who buy and sell the cards.26 This fact may limit the applicability of our findings to other markets.
But, as reported below, the effects we observe do not change based on the gender of the buyer
nor the experience of the buyer or seller in the baseball card market. This suggests that the
gendered nature of the market does not disturb our overall findings.27
We also note that nearly all baseball cards offered for sale on eBay include a photograph of
the card alone. It is not common for the photograph to include Including the hand of the seller.
We included the hand because that was the only way to ensure that the bidding public knew the
seller’s gender, our experimental manipulation. We were concerned that bidders do not always
observe the alias (which sometimes is a name) of the seller before deciding whether to bid.
Because we sold cards on eBay in a live market, there was no way for us to confirm whether
bidders knew the seller’s gender. While our photos of the baseball cards differed from most other
baseball cards, they were consistent within our experiment. Both the female and male sellers in
our experiment used photos with hands, permitting us to directly measure the differences.
A. Field Experiment – eBay
Part one of the study involves auctioning baseball cards on eBay28 with cards held by either a
female or male hand. We followed a methodology similar to Ayers et. al.,29 who, instead of
varying the gender of the hand holding the card, varied the race.30
We initially purchased 413 baseball cards via eBay auctions. These purchases occurred over
a three-week period with the high, winning bid with shipping included varying between $2.29
and $9.54.31 This range is similar to other studies—with a purposeful attempt to purchase cards
of “modest value” that are unlikely to be fraudulent.32 We also attempted to purchase roughly
equal amounts of professional graded cards (230) and ungraded cards (183).33

26

https://www.sportscardforum.com/articles/2011/06/wow-you-collect-sports-cards-and-youre-female/.
If anything, the gendered nature of the market would suggest that females would do worse—that is sell at a lower
price—in the market because of lack of presumed experience and knowledge of such gendered sellers. Given this
assumption, our results are perhaps even more striking—that female sellers doing better than their male
counterparts.
28
www.ebay.com
29
Ayres, I., Banaji, M. and Jolls, C., 2015. Race effects on eBay. The RAND Journal of Economics, 46(4), pp.891-917.
30
Id.
31
Excluding shipping, the winning bid was the same range, with the mean changing from $5.34 with shipping to
$5.16 without and median changing from $5.15 with shipping to $5 without.
32
The level of value of the cards is relevant because an important issue with eBay and other online markets is the
opportunity for fraudulent misrepresentations about objects (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004); producing a “fake” of a
baseball card worth near or more than $100 may be worthwhile, but producing a fraudulent copy of a $3 card is
unlikely to be, so our use of modest-value cards ensured that the risk of fraudulent copies would be minimal.
33
Professionally graded cards are in sealed enclosures with the professional grading, done by recognized authorities,
listed on the outside of the protective enclosure.
27
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We then took the purchased cards and divided them between graded and ungraded cards.
We then sorted each category of cards in alphabetical order according to the pictured player’s
last name.34 We divided the sorted cards into four stacks in round-robin fashion. This process was
done to randomly distribute the cards into four stacks35 and evenly divide graded and ungraded
cards amongst those stacks. Each of the four stacks was then assigned to our four hand models
who would be selling the cards on eBay.
The hand models consisted of two Caucasian, white male hands and two Caucasian, white
female hands.36 The hand models were selected based, in part, on a variation of size of their
hands.37 Pictures of the purchased baseball cards in the relevant hand model’s hand were then
taken. These pictures were taken on the same day under similar lighting and the same blank,
white backdrop. The models all held their cards in their right hand between their four fingers and
thumb, as shown below. The female models applied a nail polish to their fingers to amplify the
perception of the gender of the card holder.38 All cards were in an observable protective
covering—either the sealed grading case for the professionally graded cards or a protective
sleeve for the ungraded cards.

Fig. 1 -- Female hand (“Karen”)

Fig. 2 -- Female hand (“Heather”)

34

If the card had multiple players shown, we sorted the card based on the first player identified in the card. If the
card was a “team” card—showing the whole team—we sorted the card based on the team’s name.
35
Similar to the process done by Ayers et. al. to achieve a random sort.
36
The gender identification of the hands was based on the biological gender of the hand model, which coincided
with the outward appearance of the hand appearing feminine or masculine. The hands were considered “white”
because they were of a similar, light-skin color.
37
The variation between the hands was essentially a large and small male hand and large and small female hand.
This variation was chosen to further vary the gender differences between the hands. Notably, this variation in handsize has no effect on any results of the study.
38
A light, but distinct color was chosen. During a pilot test of the photos, we discovered that many subjects could
not identify the gender of the seller based upon hands without nail polish. After adding nail polish, additional pilot
testing indicated that subjects were able to discern. We did not include the seller’s name in the pilot test because
we were unsure if actual eBay bidders would view the name before bidding. In an abundance of caution, we strove
to have the subjects to discern the gender from the photograph alone.
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Fig. 3 -- Male hand (“Timothy”)

Fig. 4 -- Male hand (“Matthew”)

We then sold the cards on eBay approximately six weeks after they were purchased. We used
the exact same item title and description from the eBay auction in which we purchased the
card.39 We did not charge for shipping,40 did not offer shipping insurance, and specified that we
would only ship to the United States. Each auction lasted a week. We used a starting price of
$0.99 and no reserve price for all of our auctions.41 We included in the auction the single
photograph taken of the relevant hand holding the listed card. As Ayers et. al. noted in their
study, the photographs used in our sales were unusual in showing the card held by a hand versus
simply on its own. However, just as Ayers et. al. reported, we received no communication
suggesting any bidder viewed this as unusual or an experiment.
Each hand was given a generated user ID under which to list their eBay auctions. To generate
these IDs, we collected the most common male and female names used by 30 year-olds in the
United States. We randomly selected two male names (Matthew and Timothy) and two female
names (Heather and Karen). We then appended five random digits to the names in order to
create the eBay IDs to list the cards under as well as corresponding email addresses (required to
open the accounts). The gendered names were then associated with the gendered hands as
follows: Matthew18447—male; Timothy92833—male; Heather44902—female; and
Karen73035—female. We varied the seller’s city, which is visible to users on eBay, with Matthew
and Karen identifying as from Chicago, Illinois, Karen identifying as from Richmond, Virginia, and
Timothy listing Austin, Texas.42 An example of an eBay listing is shown below in Figure 5.

39

We changed all of the text to the eBay default font, removing other fonts and typographical emphasis.
Ayres et. al. charged for shipping. However, given that greater than 90% of the auctions through which the cards
were purchased, as well as the eBay baseball card market in general, did not charge for shipping—we decided to
mimic this market characteristic in our auctions.
41
Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves (2007) report that in a sample of one-cent coin auctions on eBay, the
one-week auction was by far the most common choice. Jin and Kato (2006) report that low starting prices and the
absence of a secret reserve price are common in eBay baseball card auctions (albeit in a sample of cards of much
higher value than those in our auctions),
42
After listing ten cards for Timothy from Richmond, Virginia, we encountered some problems with eBay. Thereafter
Timothy identified as from Austin and we overcame the eBay issues. To be cautious, in unreported results we
separately control for these original ten cards and they have no effect on any results of the study.
40
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Figure 5
Example eBay listing from field experiment

Table 1 below reports basic information about the four sellers and their respective cards in
the eBay auction. While we randomly distributed the cards to the sellers, the purchase price of
the cards appears roughly balanced among our four sellers.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Cards Auctioned in the eBay Experiment43

Graded cards
Ungraded cards
Total cards
Average Original
total price

Male Seller
#1:Matthew
57
46
103
$5.35

Male Seller
#2:Timothy
58
46
104
$5.37

Female Seller
#1: Heather
58
46
104
$5.29

Female Seller
#2: Karen
57
45
102
$5.34

Total
230
183
413
$5.34

Our auctions were conducted in roughly two rounds. The first round of auctions, which were
listed over a three-day period in August 2016,44 used all four user IDs, all of which had no eBay
history. Each hand listed roughly 50 cards over the three-day period. Two weeks later, a second
round of auctions, again using all four user IDs, were listed over two days. This second round
included the remaining cards yet to be listed as well as a relisting of cards that did not sell during
the first round.45 For this second round, all IDs had positive feedback from the first round of
43

T-tests were performed for each variation amongst the cards assigned to the four sellers and none returned any
statistical significance. That is, the distribution of graded v. ungraded; total number of cards; and original total
purchase price are statistically random.
44
This occurred over three days because of initial delays in getting all of the first round listings up and one user ID –
Timothy – initially being tied to an account that was restricted by eBay to only 10 active listings. Both of these factors
are accounted for in our analysis and neither impacted the reported results.
45
161 of the 207 female listed cards sold and 159 of the 207 male cards sold in the first round.
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sales.46 In our analysis that follows, we call the sellers in our second round “Rated sellers.” None
of the IDs received negative feedback and the amount of positive feedback obtained by the
beginning, and throughout, the second round was essentially the same.47
When a card was sold, we left identical feedback on each buyer (“great buyer, thanks”) the
day after the payment was made, and all cards were mailed the day after the card was paid for
(except for Sundays and holidays). All sellers used the same type of protective, mailing packing.
To preserve the key feature of our study’s isolation of the effect of gender from other features
of the transaction, we did not respond to any emails from eBay users who contacted us about
our cards during the pendency of an auction. This being said, in the overwhelming majority of
transactions, we had no email contact at all during the auction or from the auction’s winner.
We recorded the date sold, sell price, number of bids, zip code of the buyer, eBay rating of
the buyer, and gender of the buyer inferred from the buyer’s first name.48 We also recorded the
number of page views the auction received.
B. Laboratory Experiment – Mechanical Turk
The second part of our study further examined the impact of gender on baseball card sale
price. Instead of selling cards on eBay, this part of the study asked Amazon mechanical turkers
(MTurkers)49 to answer a series of questions based on a “mock” eBay auction that displayed a
baseball card held by either a male or female hand.
Two ungraded baseball cards were collected, one from the 1970s and 1980s of a famous but
generally lesser known baseball player50 and one from the 1990s of a famous and well-known

46

Positive feedback on eBay is earned when a transaction partner leaves a positive remark about the transaction.
The mean number of feedback reviews after the first round for all hands varied between 10 to 15 positive reviews.
Although our seasoned sellers’ positive feedback scores were low relative to the scores of more experienced eBay
users with many more transactions under their belts, there is some evidence that the level of positive feedback—as
distinguished from the presence of meaningful negative feedback—is not significant to eBay users. In particular,
Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves (2007) find that though sellers’ feedback scores have no statistically
significant effect on sale prices of coins in eBay one-cent coin auctions, negative feedback does have a statistically
significant effect. Likewise, both Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004) and Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that online
buyers put significantly more weight on negative than positive feedback. Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and
Lockwood (2006), however, find, in a field study in which a seller with a four-digit eBay feedback score also sold
matched items under user IDs with single- or double-digit feedback scores, some evidence of a positive effect of the
four-digit score; Melnik and Alm (2002) also find positive, though small, effects of sellers’ feedback scores. Houser
and Wooders (2006), Cabral and Hortacsu (2010), and Lei (2011) find larger positive effects of increases in a given
seller’s level of positive feedback.
48
A few purchasers had names that were difficult to categorize as male or female. We coded these as unidentifiable.
49
Mechanical turk is commonly used to get subjects for surveys and administer them. Paolucci, G., Chandler J., &
Ipeirotis, P. 2010. Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Judgment & Decision Making, 5(5), pp.411419.
50
Bruce Sutter – a pitcher from 1976 to 1988 who was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2006.
47
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baseball player.51 The same hand model for one of the male and one of the female hands were
used.52 Each was photographed holding both cards in similar lighting with a blank, white
backdrop as used in the field experiment. The cards were also held—with the right hand between
the four fingers and thumb—as they were in field experiment. And the female hand applied
similar nail polish as was applied for the field experiment.
The pictures shown in Figure 6 below were then used to create fake eBay listings, with the
hand picture prominently displayed on the right and on the left the eBay logo, a short description
of the card, and “Seller information” indicating Karen, for the female hand, or Matthew, for the
male hand. The cards were in an observable protective sleeve and were not graded.
Figure 6
Mock eBay listings for MTurk study

The mock eBay listing was shown in June 2017 to approximately 1100 MTurkers, with the
requests distributed equally amongst male and female MTurkers in the United States in age
ranges starting at 18 years old.53 The MTurkers were offered $1.00 to complete the survey. In the
51

Ken Griffey, Jr. – an outfielder from 1989 to 2010 who was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2016.
We recognize that the hand size also varies by gender. By varying both gender and hand size, we risk confounding
the results. We chose to do so to maximize the chances that subjects would recognize the gender, but we cannot
rule out the differences are due to hand size. However, given that the hand size variation did not change the results
in the eBay experiment, such an impact on this part of the study is unlikely.
53
For an additional fee, Amazon permits a researcher to specify “Premium Qualifications” for the MTurk sample. By
paying that fee, we were able to request that our sample comprise half male and half female MTurkers. The requests
were spread out over age bands for both male and female MTurkers. These age ranges were 18-24, 25-30, 31-35,
36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 50-55, and over 55 years old.
52
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end, 1,050 MTurkers completed the survey. The summary statistics reported in Table 2 below
show that our sample appears relatively balanced in the observable covariates.
Table 2
Summary Statistics on Demographic Information of MTurker Subjects
MTurker characteristic

Male Seller

Female Seller

Total

N
Age (mean)
Female54
Race (White)

526
38.88
54.4% (286)
78.0% (410)

524
38.25
46.8% (245)
73.9% (387)

1050
38.57
50.6% (531)
75.9% (797)

Race (Black/African
American)
Race (South or East Asian)

6.7% (35)

7.8% (41)

7.2% (76)

9.7% (51)

12.4% (65)

11.1% (116)

Hispanic

8.2% (483)

7.6% (484)

7.9% (967)

Politics (Democrat)

40.1% (211)

42.2% (221)

41.1% (432)

Income ($50K or more)

49.2% (259)

46.8% (245)

48.0% (504)

Education (Bachelor’s degree 62.2% (327)
or more)
Employment (full-time)
66.4% (349)
Actively collect cards
25.9% (136)

60.5% (317)

61.3% (644)

68.5% (359)
23.3% (122)

67.4% (708)
24.6% (258)

The survey presented a series of 31 questions while showing one of the four mock eBay
listings shown above on each question page. The photo was selected at random and the same
photo was used throughout the survey. Each subject only saw a single photo. Most questions
requested responses on a seven-point Likert scale. After completing each page of the survey, the
subjects were not permitted to move back and change answers. A copy of the entire survey is
reproduced in the Appendix.
The first page asked essential questions for an eBay auction—“How interested would you be
in buying this card?” and “How much do you think this card is worth in dollars and cents?” The
worth question presented a sliding scale between $0 and $7 dollars. The subject also had the

54

Two-tailed p-value from T-test assuming unequal variance is 0.0136. This was due to chance, and the gender of
the subject is distinct from the gender of the mock seller of the cards. We control for gender of the subject in the
regressions reported below.
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option of selecting “I don’t know” for this worth question—which if selected prompted the
subject to guess on the same $7 dollar scale.
The second page of questions focused on the subject’s opinion regarding the desirability and
condition of the shown baseball card. These questions included:
•
•
•
•

How famous is the player shown on the baseball card?
How desirable is this baseball card?
How common or rare is this baseball card?
What condition is the baseball card in?

The third page sought insight into the mechanisms behind the subject’s earlier answers.
These questions probed what the subject thought about the “seller”. These questions included:
• How likely do you think the seller will promptly mail the card after purchase?
• How likely do you think the seller has handled the card with proper care?
• How likely do you think the seller will properly package the card for shipment?
• How likely do you think you will have any problems with the seller?
• Would you buy a baseball card from this seller?
• How willing would you be to meet with the seller in person to discuss future
purchases, if the seller were local?
The fourth page sought to confirm that subject perceived the same gender that the presented
hand and name was supposed to convey. Accordingly, the subject was asked “Is the seller of the
card a male or female?”55 and “How masculine or feminine is the seller?” We also included a
validation question on this page to ensure that the subject was paying attention.56
Finally, on the fifth page, to probe further into the mechanisms, we asked the subject
“Do you think the seller is probably attractive?”
We then presented the subject with a series of demographic questions including age, gender,
race, education, politics, etc. This portion included questions on the subject’s experience and
familiarity with baseball card collecting. The survey ended with an open-ended question asking
the subject to “Briefly describe how you selected the dollar value of the baseball card shown
previously.”

55

95% of the subjects (995 out of 1050) correctly identified the gender of the seller. The price provided by the
subjects who incorrectly identified the gender were not statistically significantly different from those who correctly
identified the gender, based upon a t-test.
56
One MTurker subject failed the validation question. This result was excluded from our calculations.
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II.

Results

In this section, we first report the results of the eBay field experiment. Then, we analyze the
results of the MTurk experiment.
A. eBay Field Experiment
The eBay field experiment has the benefit of identifying actual preferences of buyers. The
users of eBay, including all bidders and the successful buyers of the cards, while voluntarily
bidding on our auctions and receiving the cards they bid on, did not know about the on-going
experiment. They paid for the cards so we can assume that these prices reflect the actual value
of the cards to the buyers. In Table 3 below, we report descriptive information about the results
of the field experiment.
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Cards Auctioned in the eBay Experiment

Ave. # of bids
Ave. # of page views
Rating of buyer
Profit57
Buyer gender
Buyer experience58
Total cards unsold
Buyer zip code in top quarter of
US income
#

Male Seller
3.405
15.63
835.7
-$3.775
93.7% male
0.715
49
44.2%

Female Seller
3.273
14.12
872.0
-$3.516
91.3% male
0.782
45
43.8%

Total
3.339
14.87
854.0
-$3.646
92.5% male
0.748
94
44.0%

207

206

413

It’s important to note that both the male and female sellers lost money. On average we lost
over $3.50 per card ($3.646 to be precise), including shipping on the purchase side of the
transaction.59
Our basic results are straightforward. Female sellers made approximately $0.25 more profit
than male sellers per card. The average card sold for $4.11, meaning that buyers paid about 6%
more for a card sold by a woman.
57

The reported “Profit” does not include the cost of shipping the cards we sold on eBay. This cost was borne by the
seller, not the buyer, and was simply communicated to the buyer that we would pay for shipping, whatever the
shipping cost. Shipping the cards, via USPS first class mail, averaged around $1.00 per card. And thus, an additional
dollar can be subtracted from the average “Profit” reported in Table 3 to include this seller-side shipping expense.
58
Buyer experience is a dummy variable that is 1 if the buyer had received feedback from 250 or more transactions.
59
Shipping cost of the selling side was the actual cost to ship the purchased cards via First Class Mail through the
United Postal Service.
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To unpack more how gender relates to profit, we performed a series of OLS regressions using
profit as the dependent variable.60 We calculated the profit only on cards that sold,61
subtracting our sale price of the card from the original purchase price and the original shipping
cost (if any). Table 4 below shows the results. The main variable of interest is the gender of the
seller. Gender is of significant at 95% confidence in the full model and of marginal significance
in the remaining regression models, with female sellers being correlated with higher profits.
Table 4
OLS Regression on Profit in the eBay Experiment62

Male seller

Model 1
-0.3174*
(0.1655)

Controls
Graded card
Rated seller

Model 2
-0.2909*
(0.1651)

Model 3
-0.4863*
(0.2532)

Model 4
-0.5153**
(0.2101)

-0.0946
(0.1828)
0.2684
(0.1668)

0.7322***
(0.1759)
0.8623
(0.9255)
-0.6564***
(0.0624)
-0.5944***
(0.1076)
X
X

319
0.0200

319
0.2929

4.0762***
(0.9000)
0.8600
(0.9121)
-0.6744***63
(0.0622)
-0.6104***
(0.1077)
X
X
X
319
0.3399

Original item
price
Original shipping
Day of listing FE
City of seller FE
Grade of card FE
Obs
R-Squared

319
0.0114

In our most complete model, male sellers received about $0.50 (51.53 cents) less profit at the
mean than female sellers, with the average sale resulting in a loss of $3.646. Gender is also
marginally significant in unreported OLS regression models using raw sell price as the dependent
60

We used robust standard errors in all models reported in this paper.
As a robustness test, we ran the same regression models using profits on all cards, including unsold cards. Our
unreported results are entirely consistent with the reported regression models.
62
Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
63
In models 3 and 4, we control for the original purchase and the original shipping cost of the item. Both are
negatively correlated with profit, but the significance and direction of our main finding relating to the gender of the
seller persists. Given the correlation between the original total cost and our profit in the subsequent sale, we
considered whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects for different original total item costs. In unreported
additional results, we included a control in our regressions for whether the total original cost of the card was (i)
above or below the median, (ii) in each quartile of original total cost, and (iii) each decile. The results were consistent
with Table 4 above. The addition of these additional controls had no significant effect on our results relating to the
seller’s gender.
61

Cotropia, Masur, and Schwartz

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200409

variable. Non-parametric regressions, reported in the Appendix, show similar results for profit
and sell price. The point estimate for the gender of the seller again suggests female sellers making
more profit and selling for higher prices, although the findings are less significant. Gender was
not significant in unreported regression models on the non-financial outcome variables such as
zip code of buyer and experience of buyer. While whether the card sold is not significantly
correlated with gender, it is reassuring that the effects of gender on sold are in the same direction
and magnitude as profit. We also found no significant correlation between the gender of the
buyer and the gender of the seller.64 Only about 8% of our buyers on eBay were female, which is
unsurprisingly given the gendered nature of baseball cards. However, the small sample size of
female buyers limited our ability to deeply analyze questions relating to the buyer’s gender.
We also performed a quantile estimation for the effects of the seller’s gender. A quantile
permits unpacking of the results of the effect of gender. Instead of estimating the effects at the
mean, the quantile estimation separately evaluates the effect of gender at successive quantiles
(i.e., cards with profits in the lowest 10%, cards with profits in the highest 10%, and each 10% in
between). Quantile regression is useful when the data is expected to have unequal variation due
to factors that cannot be completely accounted for in the model.65 A quantile regression
estimates multiple coefficients to provide a more complete picture of the relationships of the
variables. Because of this, the estimates from quantile regressions are more robust against
outliers. Figure 6 below shows the quantile estimates of the effect of gender on profit. The final
quantile (0.9) has the largest negative magnitude for being male. The full quantile estimates for
profit are reported in the Appendix.

64
65

The p-value from a simple chi-squared test was 0.532.
Koenker, Roger (2005). Quantile Regression. Cambridge University Press.
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Figure 6
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Here, almost a quarter of the cards (76 out of 319) sold for the opening list price, but the
most profitable cards – the ones with the most active auctions – may be of particular interest.
The quantile estimates indicate that the final quantile has the largest gender effect size. That
quantile, 0.9, with the highest selling price and profits, were the most active auctions. These
auctions had the most bids. From these results, it appears that in the most competitive card
auctions, the benefits of being a woman were greatest.
In sum, in our eBay field experiment, we find marginal effects that cards sold by female sellers
were sold at a higher price. The effect is larger and more significant among the more expensive
and actively bid upon cards, per a separate unreported regression on those cards and the quantile
regressions.
B. MTurk Experiment
The MTurk experiment lacked the real world aspect of the eBay field experiment, but has the
benefit of aiding our search for a mechanism. Unlike the field experiment, we had subjects view
identical cards with the only manipulation being the gender of the hand holding the card. We
also were able to ask MTurkers detailed questions about their views on the card and the seller.
Moreover, we have demographic information about the subjects. The MTurkers are presumably
quite different from the population who bought cards on eBay. Most MTurkers were not
necessarily in the market for buying baseball cards, while the eBay purchasers, by definition,
Cotropia, Masur, and Schwartz
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were.66 Despite the differences in populations of the experiments, and the differences between
stated preferences (MTurkers) and actual preferences (eBay), the results on price are consistent
with female sellers receiving higher prices than male sellers.
In Table 5 below, we report descriptive information about the results of the MTurk experiment.
We report the results of a t-test comparing the results of the same questions between the male
and female seller.
Table 5
Summary Statistics on Responses of MTurker Subjects
MTurker characteristic
N
Price
Guess on Price68
Card: Interested to Buy69
Card: Famous
Card: Desirable
Card: Rare
Card: Condition70
Seller: Promptly mail71
Seller: Handle with care
Seller: Properly package
Seller: Problems with seller
Seller: Likely buy
Seller: Willing to meeting
Seller likely attractive

Male Seller
526
4.009
0.243
2.093
3.517
3.086
2.909
2.797
4.625
4.884
4.84
1.945
3.69
2.907
3.015

Female Seller
524
4.220
0.248
2.156
3.63
3.174
2.952
2.992
4.83
4.956
4.968
1.714
3.823
3.176
3.588

Total/Mean
1050
4.114
0.245
2.125
3.573
3.13
2.93
2.894
4.728
4.92
4.904
1.83
3.756
3.041
3.3

t value67
1.6785*
0.1784
0.5741
0.9919
0.8793
0.6092
4.0125***
2.8048***
0.9474
1.7440*
-2.5937***
1.2693
2.2114**
8.4434***

First, we investigate whether the MTurk study results are broadly consistent with the eBay
field experiment results. About a quarter of our MTurker subjects reported that they actively
collect baseball cards. Limiting our analysis to these active collectors, the differences between
male and female sellers in price are even larger. The average price estimated by active collectors
for the male seller was $3.94, and the average price estimated by active collectors for the female

66

Although, roughly 25% of MTurkers indicated that they were active collectors of baseball cards as reported in
Table 1, above.
67
* = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
68
A reply of 1 was “a guess” and 0 was “did not have to guess”.
69
For this and all subsequent questions about the card (except for condition), the response scale was 1 for “not at
all” to 7 for “extremely” on a Likert Scale.
70
The response scale was 1 for “poor” to 5 for “mint”. We used the commonly accepted condition grading scale for
baseball cards.
71
For this and all subsequent questions about the Seller, the response scale was 1 for “extremely unlikely” to 7 for
“extremely likely” on a Likert Scale.
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sellers was $4.24.72 In addition to the t-test results reported above in Table 5, we also, in Table
6, report the results of a series of OLS regressions on the MTurker results on price of the card.
Table 6
OLS Regression on Price in the MTurk Study73
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
-$0.2116*
-$0.2290*
-$0.2519**
(0.1260)
(0.1232
(0.1246)

Male seller

Controls
Ken Griffey Jr. Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently in
Romantic Relationship
Subject Employment
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
R-Squared

X
X
X

103374
0.0027

1033
0.0496

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1033
0.0945

Again, the main variable of interest is the gender of the seller. Gender is of marginal
significance in several regression models and 95% significance in the most complete model, with
female sellers being correlated with higher prices for the cards. This result holds true both when
comparing the means as well in the OLS regression. In the most complete OLS model, cards held
by female sellers on average are priced at about $0.25 higher than male sellers, out of an average
price of $4.11. We ran unreported additional regressions limited on price for subjects who
indicated that they did not guess. The point estimates were similar, all just above $0.20 higher
for female sellers, although the results were not statistically significant. In separate regressions
limited to subjects who guessed, the point estimates were even larger for female sellers, around
$0.45 in the full model, and marginally significant. We did not perform a median or quantile
estimation on the MTurk study since there is no expectation that the quantiles would look
different from each other, unlike the eBay experiment where the higher priced cards had a
different and more robust auction.
72

This was statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with a t value of 2.4835.
Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
74
Seventeen MTurkers were unable to get the slider to work in the survey to enter the price after they indicated
they were guessing on the price.
73
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Our MTurk experiment, while different in many respects from the eBay experiment, found
similar results on the effect of gender on price. Even though the significance is marginal in both
experiments, there is some comfort that both found the same effect in the same direction. The
MTurk experiment had the advantage of unpacking the mechanism for why female sellers receive
a premium.
We ran separate OLS regressions for each of the non-demographic survey questions. The
point estimate, as well as the statistically significant t-test results, for all of the responses to
these questions were positive for female sellers. The gender of the seller was statistically
significantly correlated with the following characteristics:75
Table 7
Statistically Significant Correlations between Seller Gender and MTurker Responses
Survey Question
Condition of card
Likely that seller will promptly mail
Likely that seller handled card with care
Likely to have problems with the seller
Willing to meet seller in person if local
Seller likely attractive

Direction of Correlation
Female positively correlated with better condition
Female positively correlated with prompt mailing
Female positively correlated with careful handling
Female positively correlated with unlikely
problems
Female positively correlated with willingness to
meet
Female positively correlated with likely
attractiveness

In the Appendix, we provide the full series of regression for these foregoing variables.
We next attempt to unpack the relationship between these correlations and the MTurkers’
estimates of the price of the card. We hypothesize that subjects may rely on these correlations
when selecting the price. For instance, subjects may believe that female sellers are more likely
to promptly mail the card, and therefore estimate a higher price for the card. We use a mediation
model to evaluate whether subjects’ estimates of price follow such a pathway. Basically, a
mediation model evaluates whether a variable of interest, here the gender of the seller, exerts
an effect on price through an intervening or “mediating” variable, such as whether the seller is
likely to promptly mail the card. We test the mediation model using the Sobel test.76 The Sobel
test basically checks whether the effect of the independent variable (gender of the seller) is
significantly reduced, after adding the mediator in the model. If the effect is significantly reduced,
the Sobel test lets us see whether the mediation effect is statistically significant and what
percentage of the overall effect is caused by the mediating variable.
75

Likely to Buy was marginally significant, but only in one of the three OLS regression models.
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: quantitative strategies for
communicating indirect effects. Psychological methods, 16(2), 93.
76
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We find that two of the correlations, the condition of the card and the likelihood that the
seller will promptly mail the card, are statistically significant mediators. The condition of the card
mediates 16.9% of the effect of gender on price. The likelihood that the seller will promptly mail
the card mediates 31.3% of the effect of gender on price. The full Sobel test results are reported
in the Appendix. We used these findings—that the condition of the card and the likelihood that
the seller will promptly mail the card both potentially relate to seller gender and price of the
card—to further analyze our eBay experiment. Specifically, we use data we collected during the
eBay field experiment on the grade of the card (for graded cards) and whether the seller had
been rated before selling. We interact the grade of the card with gender and include it in a
regression model. Separately, we interact whether the seller was rated with gender and include
it in a model. None of the regression results were statistically significant. When we limited the
interaction to the most highly graded cards, those with a grade of 8 of 10 or higher, then the
interaction term for female and the highly grade cards was statistically significant with a
coefficient of 1.110 and the gender of the seller became non-significant. That means that all of
the effects of gender are driven by women selling highly graded cards. Those women receive a
huge premium compared to their male counterparts. Because we did not randomize the most
highly graded cards between sellers, we do not believe too much should be drawn from this
result.77
III.

Discussion

Contrary to the many social contexts in which women face discrimination, we have identified
at least one circumstance—a male-dominated sell-side product market—in which women fare
(slightly) better than men. In addition, while we cannot definitively identify the causal reason
why women fare better in this market, our findings point primarily to a type of statistical
discrimination favoring women. Despite the fact that many of the cards were professionally
graded and all of them were encased in plastic sleeves—which means that the condition of the
cards should not have been in question—subjects on MTurk believed that the cards sold by
women were in superior condition to the ones sold by men. They also believed that women
would be better sellers and provide better customer service.
Here, it is important to highlight the additional information acquired from having run the
same study in both eBay and MTurk environments. Like Ayres et al., our eBay study is designed
to minimize the effect of statistical discrimination by relying on the sale of (some) professionally
graded cards in sealed plastic cases through artificially created eBay accounts with similar ratings.
(As the previous section indicated, our results are robust if one looks only at the professionally
graded cards.) Ayres et al. assume, on the basis of this experimental design, that statistical
77

We also performed a factor analysis to describe and analyze the different seller and card trait survey responses in
terms of factors encompassing correlated variables. The factor analysis identified three factors—seller behavior,
card attributes, and seller attractiveness. In unreported results, an OLS regression similar to that reported in Table
7 but using the three factors as dependent variables, identified both seller behavior and seller attractiveness as
statistically significant (p<0.05) and correlating positively with a female seller (consistent with the results already
reported). The full factor analysis and regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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discrimination must be playing no more than a very small role, and they attribute their results
primarily to taste-based discrimination. It is not possible to test the causal mechanism behind
discrimination directly in this type of eBay study. By contrast, our MTurk surveys reveal that
purchasers may in fact believe that female sellers will deliver higher quality goods and a superior
experience, all objective indications to the contrary.78 These impressions are consistent with eBay
data reported by other researchers showing that female sellers had higher overall reputations
than male sellers.79 Our results are particularly notable given that the vast majority of baseball
card collectors are men, which might ordinarily be expected to lead them to distrust female
participants in the marketplace. While the full subject pool in the MTurk surveys were not limited
to collectors of baseball cards, when we isolated the approximately 25% of MTurkers who
actively collect, we find an even stronger positive relationship between price and female sellers.
This provides us some comfort that our MTurk results are capturing something present in the
field experiment with real purchasers on eBay.
It is important to note again that we signaled gender to subjects two ways: by use of a
gendered name and by use of a gendered hand (with mild nail polish for the female hand). This
was deliberate—our objective was to ensure that viewers would immediately identify the hands
as female. But even though we employed hands of different sizes, and found the same effect
regardless of hand size, we cannot say that these hands represent the median or modal female
hand.80 We cannot say whether the name alone, the hand alone, or the combination of the two
is driving the effect we find. It is certainly possible that female hands may signal something other
than the gender of the seller. For instance, the female hand we used may have seemed more
“delicate” than the male hand or more likely to handle the cards carefully. (Of course, this is itself
a gendered notion; our point is that the particular female hand we chose might have appeared
particularly delicate, in comparison to the hairy male hand.) Although we cannot distinguish
between subjects’ reactions to the sellers’ hands and the sellers’ names, we believe that our
study actually has greater external validity because of this design. In the real marketplace, buyers
and sellers often interact in person, viewing each others’ hands, faces, etc. A study that only used
names to indicate gender would not be as comprehensive in capturing how gender influences
market transactions.
78

One might doubt the reliability of the MTurk survey results, given that it is merely a survey and no money
exchanged hands. However, MTurk respondents had no reason to lie on these surveys. In addition, we obtain the
same main result in both the eBay and MTurk environments, which leads us to believe that the results from MTurk
are reliable. Lastly, prior studies indicate that MTurk results are generally reliable across a wide variety of contexts.
79
Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 11 at 2 (“Women sellers had an average reputation of 275, as opposed to an
average of 260 for the men (P < 0.001). Likewise, women had a slightly higher percentage of transactions for which
positive feedback had been given in the year preceding the current transaction (99.60% for women and 99.58% for
men, P < 0.05).”
80
According to one recent survey, approximately 2/3 of American women use nail polish at least some of the time.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/276463/us-households-usage-of-nail-polish-and-nail-care-products/. That does
not necessarily mean that they would necessarily wear it in a picture posted on eBay, or that it would necessarily be
a color that is typically identified as female. We were unable to find reliable data on the percentage of American
men who wear nail polish, though one recent survey, approximately 30% of respondents said that it would be
“acceptable” for men to wear it. https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2016/11/01/maleswear-makeup.
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In addition, there is a long history of female sexuality being used to sell products—one need
only look at the typical automobile or beer commercial—and significant evidence that this type
of approach is successful at enticing male purchasers.81 The use of sexuality to sell products even
extends, in particularly explicit fashion, to eBay. This is particularly true for products of which
most of the purchasers will be male. For instance, fly-fishing lures and video games are
occasionally sold on eBay using pictures that show them resting on female décolletage.82 There
is also some evidence in our data that buyers were thinking about female sellers as sexual objects
when they were making their purchases. Buyers indicated that they were more willing to meet
up in person with female sellers, and they indicated that they believed the female sellers were
more likely to be attractive. This is evidence that our results may be due in part to pure tastebased discrimination: male purchasers may have an affinity for female sellers of baseball cards,
even when those sellers are represented only through a name and a hand. Or it may be that some
buyers consciously or subconsciously believe that female sellers of baseball cards are less
knowledgeable about the true value of the cards. These buyers may imagine that female sellers
are offering the cards for too low a price, leading the buyers to subsequently bid up the price. It
may also be that some buyers, who were not themselves biased, bid as if they believed that other
buyers were biased. The unbiased buyers might have raised their bids to account for their
expectation that other (biased) buyers would do the same.83 For this reason, we cannot know if
our results will be externally valid to all conceivable product markets, including markets that are
not highly gendered. In addition, it raises the implication that not all female sellers will be equally
successful in these markets. Instead, it is possible that the only female sellers who will succeed
are those who strongly conform to gender stereotypes and present as highly feminized.
Under U.S. law, gender stereotypes of this sort are generally considered invidious. When the
state acts on the basis of such gender stereotypes, or acts in such a way as to reinforce such
gender stereotypes, that action is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.84 That is the case even if the gender stereotype arguably favors women;
that is, even if the stereotype is that women are more mature, or less violent, or otherwise
normatively better than men in some regard.85 As the Supreme Court has recognized, such
stereotypes often, “in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”86 However,

81

We note that products geared toward female purchasers also sometimes use female hands in eBay listings. For
such a listing of a purse, see https://www.ebay.com/itm/Kate-Spade-small-black-and-cream-foldover-crossbodyPebbled-Leather-/123215029586?nordt=true&orig_cvip=true&rt=nc&_trksid=p2047675.m43663.l44720.
82
For a more extensive description, see the unfortunately named Jared Unzipped, Using Breasts to Sell on eBay,
http://www.jaredunzipped.com/2016/04/using-breasts-to-sell-on-ebay.html.
83
A similar observation was made by Ayers et. al. in their study focused on race. Ayers, supra, at 897. See also,
Roth, A.E. and Ockenfels, A., 2002. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence
from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet. American economic review, 92(4), pp.1093-1103.
84
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979); Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Local No. 106, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass’n, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975).
85
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
86
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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there is federal no law banning discrimination among buyers and sellers in the marketplace,87
though some states have laws that address discriminatory conduct in buying and selling.88
Nonetheless, such gender stereotypes, if applied by market participants, can serve to
discriminate against women who do not conform to them. Suppose that it is the case generally
that women with carefully manicured hands and painted nails will be more effective at selling
products because customers prefer to buy from them, either online or in a brick-and-mortar
store. This creates an incentive for the owners of these retail outlets to hire women who conform
to this gender stereotype, or to encourage their employees to conform to the stereotype. These
types of actions are often unlawful under Title VII,89 but even where not unlawful, they should
generally be considered harmful. That is because they disadvantage a segment of the
population—women who do not wish to present in a highly feminized manner—who are already
frequently disadvantaged in other regards. Here, too, the motivation of the customers is
essentially irrelevant.90 In the employment context, hiring on the basis of gender is illegal, even
if there is a statistical basis that one gender performs better than the other.91 Whether customers
prefer feminized female sellers because they believe they have treated the products with more
care, or whether they prefer them because they are sexually attracted to them, the invidious
effect on the labor market is identical.
For this reason, we believe that our study may offer more bad news than good. But it would
be premature to arrive at any sort of definitive conclusion. More research is necessary to
determine precisely what is driving the higher sale prices for women in our study. In addition, it
will be important to determine whether the effect we observe is consistent across more product
markets, or whether it is limited to baseball cards and similar markets. The majority of purchasers
of baseball cards are likely to be male. Baseball card prices are also highly influenced by the
condition of the card. Follow-on studies involving objects that are mainly bought and sold by
women, or equally by individuals of both genders, and studies involving goods where condition
is not as much at issue, could be useful in shedding more light on the causal mechanisms at work.

87

Ian Ayres and Antonia Rose Ayres-Brown, Unhappy Meals: Sex Discrimination in Toy Choice at McDonald’s, 21
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 237 (2015).
88
See, e.g., California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.
89

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352.

90

See e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757
(2013); Katherine Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and
Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Martha Chamallas,
Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2370
(1994). Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work,
in Employment Discrimination Stories 105 (2006).
91
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Appendix
MTurk Questionnaire
[Note: Below is the image of the Ken Griffey Jr. card sold by a female seller. The text of all surveys were identical,
and the image of the card was varied as the experimental manipulation.]

Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:

How interested would you be in buying this card?
Extremely

Moderately

Not at all

How much do you think this card is worth in dollars and cents?

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
($X.XX)
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I don’t
know

Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:

If you had to guess, how much do you think this card is worth in dollars and cents?
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

($X.XX)
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6

6.5

7

Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:

How famous is the player shown on the baseball card?
Extremely

Moderately

Not at all

Moderately

Not at all

How desirable is this baseball card?
Extremely

How common or rare is this baseball card?
Extremely
Rare

Very Rare

Average
Moderately (Neither Rare Moderately
Rare
or Common) Common

Very
Common

Extremely
Common

What condition is the baseball card in?
Mint

Excellent
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Poor

Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:
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Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:

Is the seller of the card a male or female?
Male
Female
Unsure

How masculine or feminine is the seller?
Extremely
masculine

Moderately
masculine

Neither
Slightly
masculine nor
masculine
feminine

Slightly
feminine

Moderately
feminine

What year is it today?
2012
2017
2015
2020
Cotropia, Masur, and Schwartz
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Extremely
feminine

Answer the following questions about the baseball card below being sold on eBay:

Do you think the seller is probably attractive?
Extremely
likely

Moderately
Neither likely
likely
Slightly likely nor unlikely

Slightly
unlikely

Moderately
unlikely

Survey Taker Info
What is your gender?
Male
Female
Other
Decline to answer

What is your current age?
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Extremely
unlikely

What do you consider to be your racial/ethnic background?
White
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaska Native
South or East Asian
Hawaiian Native or Pacific Islander
Other
Decline to answer

Do you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino?
Yes
No

What is your primary language (the one you speak most of the time)?
English
Spanish
Chinese
French
German
Dutch
Japanese
Hebrew
Other (specify)
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Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other

What do you expect your 2017 family income from all sources before taxes to be?
Under $25,000
$25,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
Over $150,000

What is the highest level of education you completed?
Did not graduate high school
High school graduate or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college credit, no degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional or Doctorate degree

How would you describe your current employment status?
Employed full time for self
Employed full time for small corporation
Employed full time at large corporation
Employed full time for government and not-for-profit organization
Unemployed / Looking for work
Cotropia, Masur, and Schwartz
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Student
Homemaker
Retired
Other

Are you in an exclusive romantic relationship?
Yes
No

Do you consider yourself
Heterosexual or straight
Gay
Lesbian
Bisexual
Not listed above (please specify)
Decline to answer

Do you actively collect sports memorabilia such as baseball cards?
Yes
No

Have you ever collected sports memorabilia such as baseball cards?
Yes
No
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Briefly describe how you selected the dollar value of the baseball card shown previously.

End Text

Thank you for participating in our survey. We are interested in learning about how people value
items. Your responses will help us understand the valuation process.
If you have any questions about the survey, please contact: Christopher Cotropia, University
of Richmond Law School, 28 Westhampton Way, Richmond, VA 23173,
ccotropi@richmond.edu 804-484-1574.
Click below to finish the survey and receive your unique ID to enter into MTurk to receive
payment.
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Appendix Table 1
Bootstrapped Median Regression on Profit (all cards) in the eBay Experiment92
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Male seller
-0.01
-0.01
-0.0953
-0.0686
(0.1103)
(0.1215)
(0.1809)
(0.2057)
Controls
Graded card
Rated seller

-0.06
(0.1240)
0.1
(0.1207)

1.2095***
(0.1371)
1.2500
(1.0486)
-0.6771***
(0.0402)
-0.0520***
(0.1431)
X
X

413
0.0016

413
0.2100

Original item
price
Original shipping
Day of listing FE
City of seller FE
Grade of card FE
Obs
Pseudo RSquared

92

413
0.0000

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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0.7665
(4.3455)
1.4051
(1.1341)
-0.6790***
(0.0531)
-0.5442***
(0.1515)
X
X
X
413
0.2245

Appendix Table 2
Quantile Regression on Profit (all cards) in eBay Experiment93
Quantile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
0
0.008 -0.012 -0.095 -0.266 -0.232 -0.270 -0.912
(0.054) (0.077) (0.117) (0.140) (0.143) (0.234) (0.264) (0.237) (0.658)
Pseudo- 0.4411 0.3605 0.3904 0.2581 0.2100 0.1859 0.1642 0.1562 0.1231
R^2
Appendix Table 3
OLS Regression on Condition of Card in the MTurk Study94
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
-0.1958***
-0.1994***
-0.2040***
(0.0488)
(0.0486)
(0.0475)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr. Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
1050
R-Squared
0.0151

X
X
X

1050
0.0276

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1050
0.0958

93

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The control variables are the same controls in the full
regression model.
94
Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 4
OLS Regression on Seller Promptly Mail in the MTurk Study95
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
-0.2047**
-0.2058**
-0.2092**
(0.0730)
(0.0730)
(0.0760)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr. Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
1050
R-Squared
0.0074

95

X
X
X

1050
0.0186

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1050
0.0287

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 5
OLS Regression on Seller Properly Package in the MTurk Study96
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
-0.1273*
-0.1238*
-0.1399*
(0.0730)
(0.0729)
(0.0750)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr.
Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
R-Squared

96

1050
0.0029

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1050
0.0195

X
X
1050
0.0442

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 6
OLS Regression on Problems with Seller in the MTurk Study97
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
0.2311***
0.2439***
0.2348***
(0.0891)
(0.0883)
(0.0870)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr.
Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
R-Squared

97

1050
0.0064

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1050
0.0205

X
X
1050
0.0921

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 7
OLS Regression on Willing to Meet in the MTurk Study98
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
-0.2687**
-0.2164**
-0.2436**
(0.1215)
(0.1195)
(0.1185)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr.
Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
R-Squared

98

1050
0.0046

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1050
0.0494

X
X
1050
0.0951

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 8
OLS Regression on Attractive in the MTurk Study99
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Male seller
-0.5726***
-0.5749***
-0.5570***
(0.0578)
(0.0679)
(0.0668)
Controls
Ken Griffey Jr.
Card
Subject Gender
Subject Age
Subject Race
Subject Hispanic
Subject Politics
Subject Income
Subject Education
Subject Currently
in Romantic
Relationship
Subject Sexuality
Collect Cards
Obs
R-Squared

99

1050
0.0046

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1050
0.0494

X
X
1050
0.0951

Note that robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 9
Mediation Model (Promptly Mail as Mediator Variable)

promptly_mail
2.2

ε1

1.4

-.17

.21

-.18

.5

price

MaleHand
.25

4.6

ε2

4.1

Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Coef
Std Err
Sobel
-.03585585 .01677686
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -.03585585 .01722629
Goodman-2
-.03585585 .01631506
a coefficient =
b coefficient =
Indirect effect =
Direct effect =
Total effect =

Coef
.213307
-.168095
-.035856
-.175749
-.211605

Std Err
.07366
.053071
.016777
.126031
.126071

Z
-2.137
-2.081
-2.198

P>Z
.03258009
.03739176
.02796942

Z
2.89585
-3.16733
-2.13722
-1.39448
-1.67846 .

P>Z
.003781
.001538
.03258
.163172
093257

Proportion of total effect that is mediated: .16944742
Ratio of indirect to direct effect:
.20401769
Ratio of total to direct effect:
1.2040177
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Appendix Table 10
Mediation Model (Condition as Mediator Variable)
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests
Coef
Sobel
-.06644251
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -.06644251
Goodman-2
-.06644251
a coefficient =
b coefficient =
Indirect effect =
Direct effect =
Total effect =

Coef
.192994
-.344272
-.066443
-.145162
-.211605

Std Err
.0227984
.02312836
.0224636

Z
-2.914
-2.873
-2.958

P>|Z|
.00356431
.00406888
.00309857

Std Err
.049053
.079359
.022798
.12593
.126071

Z
P>|Z|
3.93437 .000083
-4.33818 .000014
-2.91435 .003564
-1.15272 .249024
-1.67846 .093257

Proportion of total effect that is mediated: .31399373
Ratio of indirect to direct effect:
.45771263
Ratio of total to direct effect:
1.4577126
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